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THE ROUGHLY  60 percent  appreciation  in the real  value of the U. S. dollar 
between 1979 and 1985  created an environment  that was increasingly 
conducive  to protectionist  politics in the United States. Automobile  and 
steel quotas  were imposed. A textile quota  bill was passed in the House 
of Representatives.  Motorcycles were subjected  to quotas and tariffs. 
And pressures mounted  for protection of the semiconductor  and tele- 
communications  equipment  markets. 
The 1981  voluntary  export restraint  agreement  with Japan  on auto- 
mobiles marked  the first overt attempt  to protect the U.S. automobile 
industry  from imports since World War II. The 1984 steel voluntary 
restraint  agreements,  on the other hand, represent  the third  episode in 
protection for the U.S.  steel industry in two decades. The first steel 
restraints  began  in 1969  and  lasted  until  1974.  Triggerprices  were  imposed 
in 1978  and extended, erratically,  into 1982.  The current  steel restraints 
have been implemented  with twenty-five major steel exporting coun- 
tries.  ' 
Each of these exercises in trade restraint has been advanced as 
"temporary,"  designed to provide the U.S. producers  with breathing 
room to adjust to the changes in world market  conditions.2  But have 
1. A number  of steel exporters,  including  Canada,  Taiwan,  Argentina,  and Sweden, 
remain  outside  the  formal  voluntary  agreement  although  implicit  understandings  may  exist 
with some of them. Altogether,  there are twenty-five  countries  exporting  steel to the 
United  States  without  a formal  agreement. 
2. For a review of the effects of past attempts  to provide  industries  with breathing 
room  through  temporary  trade  protection,  see Robert  Z. Lawrence  and  Paula  R. DeMasi, 
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they been successful  in achieving  this goal?  This report  seeks to provide 
at least a partial  answer  to that  question,  beginning  with an examination 
of the effectiveness of the restraints  in increasing  domestic prices and 
output. 
Restraining Steel and Automobile Imports 
Under the General  Agreement  on Tariffs and Trade, countries are 
more likely to use quotas  or voluntary  restraint  agreements  than tariffs 
to protect favored or troubled industries. Country-by-country  agree- 
ments substitute  for formal tariff  increases that could not be imposed 
unilaterally  under  the GATT. 
Because of two major  differences  in the steel and automobile  indus- 
tries, voluntary  restraint  agreements  are likely to have quite different 
results in the two industries. First, steel is a producers' good while 
automobiles  are finished  consumer durables.  Restrictions  on steel im- 
ports unaccompanied  by restrictions  on fabricated  products  made  from 
steel are likely to induce a substitution  of machinery,  equipment,  and 
vehicle imports  for steel. Without  a "multimetal  agreement,"  therefore, 
steel quotas are likely to be relatively ineffective in the long run. 
Automobiles,  on the other hand, have few ready substitutes  other than 
cars already  on the road. Thus, universal  automobile  quotas are likely 
to be more  effective than  universal  steel quotas. 
Second, steel is an almost ubiquitous  industrial  product  while auto- 
mobile production  is heavily concentrated  in North America, Europe, 
and Japan. In the past decade, moreover, the Japanese have vaulted 
ahead of the rest of the world, particularly  in smaller  cars. As a result, 
import restraints  aimed solely at Japanese automobiles can be quite 
effective in Europe or in the United States because there are no ready 
substitutes  for them from other parts of the world. Implicit  quotas on 
Japanese cars in Europe and explicit quotas on Japanese automobile 
exports  to the United  States  have not induced  large  diversions  of exports 
in either  direction  across the North Atlantic. On the other  hand, quotas 
"Do Industries  with a Self-Identified  Loss of Comparative  Advantage  Ever Adjust?"  in 
Gary C. Hufbauer and Howard F. Rosen,  eds.,  Domestic  Adjustment and International 
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on steel from a limited number of steel exporters simply induce an 
expansion  of exports  from  other countries.  There  are more  than  a score 
of major  steel exporters  and perhaps  another  twenty to thirty  who can 
increase their exports to the United States when others are restrained. 
Limiting  steel imports  from  countries  in the European  Community  (EC) 
and from  Japan  will predictably  increase imports  from Brazil, Taiwan, 
or Canada.3 
For these reasons, one would expect restraints  on Japanese  automo- 
biles to be far more effective than those on steel, and in fact they have 
been. 
The Effectiveness  of Steel Import Restraints 
The steel industry  restraints  date  from  the closing  days of the Johnson 
administration.  Quotas were negotiated  first with Japanese, then with 
European,  producers. The limitations  on exports to the United States 
became effective in 1969  and were extended to 1974,  but they appear  to 
have been binding  only in 1971-72  for most products. Earlier  research 
showed that these limits raised U.S.  steel prices 1.2 to 3.5 percent in 
1971-72.4 
The next episode of U.S. steel protection  involved trigger  prices, or 
a floor under import  prices. Trigger  prices, set equal to the estimated 
costs of production  in Japan  plus importation  costs, were in effect in 
1978-80  and  then sporadically  in 1981-82.  The  trigger  price  program  was 
launched  during  a period  of a depreciating  U.S. dollar;  hence, it had  only 
a limited effect upon prices in the early stages, raising  U.S. producer 
prices about 1  percent  in 1979.5 
As the U.S. dollar  rose in 1980,  U.S. producers  threatened  and then 
actually  filed  a number  of trade  suits against  steel exporters.  These suits 
were suspended,  leading  to a reimposition  of the trigger  prices, followed 
3. Diversion  of a homogeneous  producers'  good  can  also  occur  through  third  countries. 
A small  amount  of steel is currently  exported  to the United  States  by a number  of countries 
with no steel mills. Such evasion of the automobile  restraint  agreement  would  obviously 
be impossible  because  the origin  of a Toyota  or Nissan cannot  be concealed. 
4.  Robert W. Crandall, The U.S.  Steel Industry in Recurrent Crisis: Policy  Options in 
a Competitive World (Brookings,  1981), chap. 5. 
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by new filings  of trade  suits, and, finally,  the abolition  of the trigger  price 
system. All these changes created enormous uncertainty  among steel 
exporters. 
In 1982,  the EC agreed  to limit steel exports to the United States in 
order to settle antidumping  and countervailing  duty cases brought  by 
U.S. steel producers. Finally, in 1984, President  Reagan announced  a 
new set of voluntary  restraints  to end the Section 201  trade  case brought 
by Bethlehem  Steel earlier  in the year. These new restraints,  which  were 
to include most steel exporting  countries,  limited  finished  steel imports 
to 18.5 percent of the U.S. market  for 1985-89  and allowed the impor- 
tation  of another  1.5 million  tons of semifinished  steel. These restraints 
were not actually  negotiated  with most countries  until  mid-1985. 
To place these three episodes of trade  protection  in perspective, it is 
useful to examine  the trend  in import  penetration  and to compare  world 
export  prices with realized  U.S. prices during  1970-86  (see table 1). As 
the dollar rose after 1980, the  share of  imports in U.S.  apparent 
consumption of  steel rose with it.  The sudden surge in  1984 was 
undoubtedly  caused by exporters'  anticipation  that quotas  to be negoti- 
ated in 1984-85  would  be based on recent market  shares. 
The rising dollar and the EC settlement allowed U.S.  producer 
prices to rise substantially  above European  spot prices in 1981-84, but 
this price difference  has now begun  to narrow  with the declining  dollar. 
The  import  share  has  fallen  only modestly,  but  it remains  at a historically 
high level despite the quotas. One may conclude, therefore,  that threat 
of further  trade  restraints  and  the EC settlement  allowed  U. S. producers 
to keep their prices substantially  above world levels through 1985, 
but  the quotas  negotiated  in 1985  may  have a much  less restrictive  effect 
at the current  level of exchange  rates. 
The Effectiveness  of the Automobile Restraints 
The automobile  restraints  were directed  solely at Japan.  Beginning  in 
April 1981,  the Japanese  were to limit  their  exports  of passenger  cars to 
the United States to 1.68  million  units  a year through  March  31, 1984.  In 
1984,  the restraints  were extended  for one year  at 1.85  million  passenger 
cars, and in 1985  they were extended again  for one year at 2.3 million 
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Table 1.  U.S.  Steel Consumption, Imports, and Prices, 1970-86 
Dollars per metric ton unless  otherwise  indicated 
Apparent  Antwerp  U.S.  price 
consumptiona  Imports  Import  U.S.  spot  minus 
(millions  (millions  share  producers'  export  Antwerp 
Year  of tons)  of tons)  (percent)  priceb  pricec  price 
1970  97.1  13.4  13.8  149  n.a.  ... 
1971  102.5  18.3  17.9  159  n.a.  ... 
1972  106.6  17.7  16.6  169  n.a.  ... 
1973  122.5  15.2  12.4  179  249  -70 
1974  119.6  16.0  13.4  238  354  -  116 
1975  89.0  12.0  13.5  261  237  24 
1976  101.1  14.3  14.1  276  283  -7 
1977  108.4  19.3  17.8  298  251  47 
1978  116.6  21.1  18.1  330  315  15 
1979  115.0  17.5  15.2  365  369  -4 
1980  95.2  15.5  16.3  376  382  -  6 
1981  105.4  19.9  18.9  412  357  55 
1982  76.4  16.7  21.8  399  332  67 
1983  83.5  17.1  20.5  376  293  83 
1984  98.9  26.2  26.4  389  296  93 
1985  96.4  24.3  25.2  366  273  93 
1986  89.7  20.7  23.1  361d  302  59 
Sources: Consumption  and  imports  are  from  American  Iron  and  Steel Institute,  Annual  Statistical  Report,  various 
years. Average  prices are calculated  by the author  using  data  from  U.S. Department  of Commerce,  Bureau  of the 
Census,  Steel Mill  Products  1985,  Current  Industrial  Reports,  Series  MA33B  (Government  Printing  Office,  1986)  and 
earlier issues;  and Paine Webber,  Inc.,  World Steel Dynamics:  The Steel  Strategist,  various issues. 
n.a. Not available. 
a. Apparent  consumption  excludes  changes  in inventories. 
b. Weighted  average  of the prices  of six carbon  steel categories,  using 1979  shipment  shares  as weights. 
c. Weighted  average  Free on Board  (FOB)  spot export  price  of six carbon  steel products  from  Antwerp. 
d. Author's  estimate. 
assumed  unilateral  responsibility  for extending  them  at 2.3 million  units 
a year-a  decision reaffirmed  this year  for 1987-88. 
The level  of  automobile imports in the  1980s suggests that the 
automobile  restraints were much more effective than those on steel 
(table  2). With  the dollar  rising  sharply  between 1980  and 1984,  the share 
of U.S. automobile  sales accounted for by Japanese  imports  fell from 
21.2  percent  to 18.3  percent.  The  modest  recovery  in  the  Japanese  import 
share  since 1984  reflects  the increase  in the quota  in April 1985. 
Further evidence of  the differences in effectiveness of  the two 
voluntary  restraint regimes may be found in the prices of Japanese 
imports  and  domestic automobiles.  A simple  model of the determinants 
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Table 2.  U.S.  Automobile Sales and Import Shares,  1975-86 
Total  Import share 
U.S.  new  (percent) 
car sales 
Year  (millions)  Total  From Japan 
1975  8.63  18.2  9.4 
1976  10.10  14.8  9.3 
1977  11.18  18.5  12.4 
1978  11.31  17.7  12.0 
1979  10.64  21.9  16.6 
1980  8.98  26.7  21.2 
1981  8.53  27.3  21.8 
1982  7.98  27.9  22.6 
1983  9.18  26.0  20.9 
1984  10.39  23.5  18.3 
1985  11.04  25.7  20.1 
1986  11.45  28.3  20.7 
Sources: Motor  Vehicle  Manufacturers  Association  of the United  States, MVMA  Facts & Figuires, '86 (Detroit: 
MVMA,  1986),  p. 16. Data  for 1986  are taken  from  Automotive  News, January  12, 1987,  p. 42. 
underpredicts  1984  prices by about $2,400, an increase of $2,100 from 
mid-1981.6 A comparison  of the prices of two of the most popular  small 
Japanese  cars  in  the  United  States  and  Japan  provides  similar  conclusions 
(table 3). By 1984-85, it appears  that the restraints  had become quite 
restrictive  because of the sharp rise in the value of the dollar and the 
growth  in U.S. automobile  demand.  A simple  reaction  function  suggests 
that  U.S. auto prices respond  to import  prices with an elasticity  ranging 
from  0.3 to 0.4.7  If this finding  is correct, U.S. domestic car prices were 
$750  to $1,000  higher  in 1984-85  because of the quotas. 
This  estimate  of the effects of the restraints  on imported  and  domestic 
auto prices is  substantially  above others that have appeared in the 
literature, primarily  because it adjusts for the effect of the yen and 
extends through  1984-85.  Robert  Feenstra,  for example,  has not explic- 
itly allowed  for the effects of the strong  dollar  in his estimates.8 Michael 
6. The model uses Japanese  wage rates, interest  rates, steel prices, and the value of 
the yen to explain imported  Japanese  car prices over the period 1976-80. Robert W. 
Crandall,  "The Effects of the Voluntary  Export  Agreement  on U.S. Automobile  Prices, 
1981-84,  " paper  presented  at  the  annual  meeting  of the  Society  of Government  Economists 
(December  1985). 
7.  Crandall,  "The  Effects  of the Voluntary  Export  Agreement." 
8.  See, for example, Robert  C. Feenstra, "Automobile  Prices and Protection:  The 
U.S.-Japan  Trade  Restraint,"  Journal  of Policy Modelling,  vol. 7 (Spring  1985),  pp. 49- 
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Table 3.  The Effects of Voluntary Restraint Agreements on U.S.  List Prices of Imp irted 
Japanese Automobiles, 1980-85 
Dollars per car 
Average 
Prices  U.S.-Japan  se 
price 
Year  Actuala  Predictedb  Difference  differencec 
1980  5,976  6,228  -  252  518 
1981  7,077  6,786  291  1,312 
1982  7,766  7,414  352  2,428 
1983  7,960  6,257  1,703  2,862 
1984  8,501  6,110  2,391  2,972 
1985  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  3,252 
Source: Author's  calculations  using  data  from World  Cars,  various  issues. 
n.a. Not available. 
a. Average  list price  of U.S. automobile  imports  from  Japan  standardized  for options  loading  and  vehicle  mix. 
b. See text description  and footnote  6. 
c. Average  difference  between list prices for two leading  Japanese  subcompact  cars in the United States and 
Japan. 
Bryan  and Owen Humpage  allow for currency  effects, but their  results 
extend only through 1983.9  The strong automobile  market  in 1984-85 
allowed  U. S. producers  to realize  prices  far  above those they could  have 
sustained  if there had been an elastic supply of Japanese  imports  at a 
price $2,500 lower than the realized import price in 1984-85. On the 
other  hand,  had  the U.S. industry  been competitive,  the  prices  of imports 
and domestic cars would  probably  have risen far  less in response to the 
restraints  unless a capacity constraint  had been binding. Because the 
domestic market  is so concentrated,  the restraints  appear  to have been 
a "facilitating" instrument  in allowing output restraint among U.S. 
producers.  10 
As the dollar has fallen, the effect of the automobile  restraints  has 
diminished.  The Japanese  continue  to limit  their  exports  of automobiles 
to the United States to 2.3 million  units, but a stagnating  U.S. market, 
rising  U.S. production  of Japanese  cars, and  the 60 percent  appreciation 
of the yen since 1984  has made  the restraints  largely  irrelevant.  Indeed, 
a recent analysis of U.S. and Japanese  production  costs suggests that 
9. Michael  F. Bryan  and  Owen  F. Humpage,  "Voluntary  Export  Restraints:  The Cost 
of Building  Walls," Economic Review (Federal  Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Summer 
1984),  pp. 17-37. 
10. Kala  Krishna,  "Trade  Restrictions  as Facilitating  Practices,"  Working  Paper  1546 
(National  Bureau  of Economic  Research,  January  1985). 278  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1987 
Table 4.  U.S.  Steel Industry Profits and Investment,  1970-85 
Billions  of  1967 dollars 
Year  Profits  Investment 
1970  0.50  1.41 
1971  0.51  1.03 
1972  0.68  0.83 
1973  1.05  0.93 
1974  1.84  1.34 
1975  1.09  1.83 
1976  0.86  1.74 
1977  0.01  1.50 
1978  0.71  1.25 
1979  0.62  1.42 
1980  0.77  1.39 
1981  1.16  1.28 
1982  -  1.38  1.30 
1983  -  1.48  1.13 
1984  -  0.10  1.23 
1985  -0.46  1.43 
Sources:  Total profits of U.S.  steel  companies  are from AISI,  Annuial Statistical  Report,  various  years,  adjusted 
by author for nonreporting companies  and deflated by the overall  consumer  price index from the Ecotiomic  Report 
of  the President,  1987,  table  B-55.  Investment  is  new  plant and equipment  expenditures  from  Siurvey of  Current 
Blisiness,  vol.  66 (February  1986), deflated by the implicit price deflator for total private nonresidential  investment 
from Economic  Report of the President,  1987, table B-3, rebased to  1967. 
unit costs are equalized in the auto industry at about 150 yen to the 
dollar,  or very close to the dollar's  value in early 1987.  11 
The Impact of Import Restraints on Investment and Profits 
The express rationale  of the trade  restraints  for both autos and steel 
is to give each industry  breathing  room to reassert its competitiveness 
through  investment  and cost cutting.  The 1970s  restraints  and the 1978- 
80 trigger prices may have enhanced U.S.  steel producers' profits 
marginally  and in so doing may have stimulated  investment either by 
increasing  expected future  profitability  or through  increased  cash flow. 
Real steel industry  profits  rose in 1978-81, aided by the falling  dollar  in 
1978-79  and  by the trigger  prices. Since 1981,  however, the industry  has 
been earning  negative  real profits  (table  4). Real investment  in steel has 
11. Clifford  Winston  and Associates, Blind Intersection?  Policy  and the Automobile 
Industry  (Brookings,  1987),  pp. 19-20. Robert  W. Crandall  279 
Table  5. Modernization,  Capacity  Reductions,  and the Return  on Common  Equities 
in the Steel  Industry 
Annual 
investment, 
1975-81,  Market return 
as a fraction  on owning  Percentage  change 
of 1975  equity,  in capacity, 
Company  market valuea  1982-86b  1981-86c 
Sharon  0.264  -0.962  - 30.6 
Wheeling-Pittsburgh  0.235  - 0.746  - 38.6 
LTVd  0.214  - 0.894  -46.3 
Kaiser  0.191  Bankrupt  -  100.0 
CF&I  0.177  -0.901  -68.4 
Bethlehem  0.165  -0.691  - 27.6 
Inland  0.160  - 0.093  -30.1 
National  0.140  - 0.330  -54.7 
Armco  0.092  -0.791  - 28.7 
U.S. Steel  0.076  -0.081  -23.0 
Interlake  0.069  0.449  - 33.3 
Source: Author's  calculations  using  annual  reports  of the above  listed  companies  and  U.S. Securities  and  Exchange 
Commission  (Forms  10-K,  Annual  Report),  various  years. 
a. Average  annual  value of real plant  and equipment  expenditures  in steel, 1975-81,  divided  by value of firm  on 
December  31, 1975  (defined  as market  value  of equity  plus book value of long-term  debt). 
b. Cumulative  return  from  holding  a share  of equity  in the firm  from  January  1, 1982,  through  December  31, 1986. 
c. Percentage  change  in raw steel capacity,  1981  to 1986. 
d. Includes  Republic  Steel. 
shown little trend  since 1977  despite the trade  restraints  that have been 
in place for most of the period. 
But if protection had been effective in raising industry cash flows 
substantially,  and if, for some reason, these additional  cash flows or 
enhanced profit margins had been successful in generating greater 
investment  outlays, the industry  would actually  be worse off than  it is. 
Beginning  in the early 1970s,  the U.S. integrated  industry  could not 
profitably  invest in major  facilities.12  High construction  costs, rapidly 
changing  minimill  technology, and stagnating  steel demand  created an 
environment  in which the incremental  returns to investment in huge 
blast  furnaces,  steel furnaces,  and  rolling  mills  were insufficient  to cover 
the cost of capital. Those firms  that invested most intensively in mod- 
ernizing  and  rounding  out their  plants  during  1975-81,  after  the large  rise 
in steel prices in 1974, generally suffered the largest losses in market 
value during  the next five years (table 5). Of the top five firms, ranked 
by investment  rate, four have begun bankruptcy  proceedings, and one 
12.  Crandall, The U.S.  Steel Industry, chap. 4. 280  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1987 
Table 6.  U.S.  Motor Vehicle Factory Sales, Profits, and Investments,  1970-85 
Real 
Factory  Profit per  Cash flow  investmentc 
sales  vehiclea  per vehicleb  (billions of 
Year  (millions)  (1967 dollars)  (1967 dollars)  1967 dollars) 
1970  8.2  128  397  2.63 
1971  10.6  391  564  1.96 
1972  11.3  418  595  2.32 
1973  12.6  345  499  2.86 
1974  10.1  47  242  2.93 
1975  9.0  138  359  1.99 
1976  11.5  368  536  2.01 
1977  12.6  410  588  3.03 
1978  12.9  354  545  3.47 
1979  11.5  181  398  3.67 
1980  8.1  -  126  191  3.66 
1981  8.0  5  323  3.71 
1982  7.0  22  359  2.72 
1983  9.2  271  589  2.50 
1984  10.7  301  586  3.90 
1985  11.4  185  432  5.07 
Sources: Based  on data  from  the following  sources:  MVMA,  MVMA Facts  and Figures,  '86; U.S. Department  of 
Commerce,  Bureau  of Economic  Analysis,  The National  Income  and Product Accounts  of the United States,  1929- 
82 Statistical  Tables (GPO,  1986);  Survey of Current Business,  vol.  66 (July 1986);  and  the Economic  Report of the 
President,  1987. 
a. Profits  before  taxes, with  inventory  valuation  adjustment,  deflated  by the consumer  price  index  and  divided  by 
total U.S. vehicle  factory  sales. 
b. Profits  before  taxes with inventory  valuation  adjustment  plus capital  consumption  allowance,  deflated  by the 
consumer  price  index  and  divided  by total U.S. vehicle  factory  sales. 
c. Investment  expenditures  in standard  industrial  classification  371 deflated  by the implicit  price deflator  for 
nonresidential  investment,  rebased  to 1967. 
has abandoned  all integrated  steel facilities. Of the bottom five, only 
Armco has shown a large loss in market  value-because  it diversified 
unsuccessfully  into  financial  services. Thus,  to the extent  that  protection 
stabilized or raised prices and contributed  to the excessive optimism 
among  steelmakers  in the mid-1970s,  it proved  to be extremely  counter- 
productive. 
In the automobile  industry,  real  profits  have risen steadily  since 1982 
despite  sharply  lower  domestic  sales of vehicles. Profits  per  unit  in 1983- 
85 were nearly  40 percent  above those in 1974-76,  when industry  output 
was similar  but  the dollar  was 30  percent  lower (table  6). Real  investment 
lagged its late 1970s levels until 1984, when it rose sharply, aided 
somewhat  by Japanese  investment  in the U.S. automobile  industry. 
The restraints  produced  an estimated  increase in cash flow of some Robert  W. Crandall  281 
$6-$8 billion,  before leakages  into other  factor suppliers'  rents.13  Thus, 
between 33 and 45 percent of the 1984-85 auto industry  cash flow may 
be attributed  to the restraints,  even assuming  no effect upon unit sales. 
This  large  increment  of cash flow, or the analogous  rise in profit  margins, 
may have had some effect upon 1985-86  industry  investment  outlays. 
The Response of Labor Costs, Productivity, and Product Quality 
Because import  restraints  reduced  competitive  pressure  from  abroad 
and  raised  industry  prices  and  profits,  they also influenced  industry  wage 
bargains.  This  section  examines  the  trends  in  labor  costs and  productivity 
during  the 1970s  and 1980s. 
WAGES 
The steel industry's  total compensation  first  accelerated  in the early 
1970s  with the first  restraints  and rose rapidly  in the late 1970s  with the 
trigger  price system (table 7).14 Since 1982, a year in which average 
wages rose sharply because of massive layoffs of low-seniority and 
therefore  lower-wage  workers, total compensation  in the steel industry 
has fallen, reflecting  the declining  condition  of the industry.  Because the 
1984  restraints  have not had a major  effect upon steel prices or profits, 
they have not been able to stem the decay of real wages in the industry. 
Moreover, the rise in the minimill share of the industry has brought 
additional  downward  pressure  on union  wages at the integrated  compa- 
nies.  15 
In the automobile industry, compensation generally tracked steel 
compensation  until steel wages began their sharp  increase in the early 
13. This  assumes  no increase  in U.S. output  due to the quotas.  For a discussion  of the 
output  effects, see Winston  and  Associates, Blind  Intersection?,  pp. 64-65. 
14. In the early 1970s,  the industry  reached  an "experimental  negotiating  agreement" 
with  the United Steelworkers  of America  that  guaranteed  the workers  at least 3 percent 
increases in real wages each year in return  for an agreement  not to strike. Such an 
agreement  on the part of management  presumably  reflected its confidence that price 
competition  from  imports  would  not be a major  problem. 
15. Since 1975,  minimill  shipments  have risen  more  rapidly  than  imports.  See Donald 
F. Barnett and Robert W. Crandall, Up from the Ashes:  The Rise of the Steel Minimill in 
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Table 7.  Average Hourly Compensation for Production Workers in the Auto Industry, 
Steel Industry, and All Manufacturing, 1970-85 
Dollars 
Ratio  to  Ratio  to 
All manu-  Motor  manufactur-  manufactur- 
Year  facturing  vehicles  ing average  Steel  ing average 
1970  4.18  5.65  1.35  5.74  1.37 
1971  4.49  6.45  1.44  6.24  1.39 
1972  4.84  7.03  1.45  7.08  1.46 
1973  5.26  7.51  1.43  7.76  1.48 
1974  5.75  8.34  1.45  8.88  1.54 
1975  6.35  9.53  1.50  10.24  1.61 
1976  6.92  10.08  1.46  11.23  1.62 
1977  7.59  11.22  1.48  12.31  1.62 
1978  8.27  12.37  1.50  13.56  1.64 
1979  9.00  13.43  1.49  15.15  1.68 
1980  9.80  15.88  1.62  17.46  1.78 
198,1  10.79  16.94  1.57  19.04  1.76 
1982  11.50  17.99  1.56  22.72  1.98 
1983  11.97  18.23  1.52  21.14  1.77 
1984  12.40  18.92  1.53  20.26  1.63 
1985  12.82  19.73  1.54  21.45  1.67 
Percentage  change 
1970-75  51.9  68.7  ...  78.4  ... 
1975-80  54.3  66.6  ...  70.5  ... 
1981-85  18.8  16.5  ...  12.7  ... 
Source: U.S. Department  of Labor,  Bureau  of Labor  Statistics,  Office  of Productivity  and Technology. 
1970s (table 7). Binding  protection in the 1980s  has allowed the auto- 
workers to resist wage reductions more successfully than the steel- 
workers and to maintain  their premium  over average manufacturing 
compensation  at  about  55  percent  in  the  early  1980s,  or  about  6  percentage 
points above the late 1970s  premium.  Ford and General  Motors were 
forced to award  fairly  generous settlements  in their 1984  wage negotia- 
tions, returning  a large share of the concessions negotiated  during  the 
1981-82  recession, because of their  large  quota-induced  profits. 
As these wage developments suggest, given the substantial  role of 
labor  costs in  both  industries,  effective  trade  protection  simply  postpones 
part of the necessary adjustment  to the loss of competitiveness. The 
steel industry today is paying for wage increases granted behind a Robert  W. Crandall  283 
protective barrier  in the 1970s,'6  and U.S. automobile  producers  may 
face further  competitive difficulties  because of their continuing  wage 
escalation. 
PRODUCTIVITY 
Since 1980,  labor  productivity  in steel and motor  vehicles has accel- 
erated sharply.  Average annual  percentage  increases are shown below 
for five-year  intervals  since 1965: 
Motor 
Steel  vehicles 
1965-70  0.0  0.5 
1970-75  1.3  4.4 
1975-80  2.0  0.7 
1980-85  5.9  6.0 
Upon closer inspection, however, it is difficult to conclude that the 
improvement  has been due to trade protection. Rather, it has been 
caused by a cyclical rebound  and capacity  retirement.  A simple  regres- 
sion analysis of labor productivity  in the motor vehicle industry (all 
employees)  from 1960  to 1985  reveals that  the automobile  quotas  had  no 
effect upon 1981-85  productivity.  (Here and elsewhere the numbers  in 
parentheses  are t-statistics.) 
(1)  logPROD  =  2.74 +  0.285 logCAPUTIL  + 0.031 TIME 
(1)  (15.41)  (7.14)  (25.54) 
-  0.008DQUOTA, 
(-0.37) 
R2  =  0.985; Durbin-Watson  =  1.77; rho =  0.223. 
Equation 1 shows the results of regressing the logarithm  of labor 
productivity (logPROD)  on the Federal Reserve Board estimate of 
industry  capacity  utilization  (logCAPUTIL), a time trend  (TIME), and a 
dummy variable (DQUOTA)  for  the  voluntary restraint period, 
16. See Colin  Lawrence  and  Robert  Z. Lawrence,  "Manufacturing  Wage  Dispersion: 
An End  Game  Interpretation,"  BPEA, 1:1985,  pp. 47-106, for a discussion  of steel wages 
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1981-85. The coefficient of DQUOTA  suggests that none of the recent 
increase in productivity  can be assigned to the quotas. Nor does this 
conclusion change for the period 1984-85. Effects of  the  1984-85 
investment  surge  on productivity  cannot  be ascertained  yet from avail- 
able data. 
A  somewhat different analysis of  steel productivity is  required. 
Between 1981  and 1985,  the steel industry  retired  nearly  30 million  tons 
of extremely inefficient  integrated  capacity. The retirement  program, 
by itself, should have raised average industry productivity substan- 
tially, accounting  for a large share of the startling  rebound  since 1980. 
To  account  for  this,  a  separate variable for  industry capacity 
(logCAPACITY) is included  as a shift variable  in equation  2, estimated 
for the period 1962  to 1985: 
(2)  logPROD  =  9.46  +  0.366 logCAPUTIL  +  0.020 TIME 
(12.77)  (8.14)  (20.31) 
-  1.37 logCAPACITY, 
(-8.90) 
k  =  0.951; Durbin-Watson  =  2.03; rho =  0.225. 
As expected,  the  capacity  variable  proves  to be important  in  explaining 
the recent rise in productivity.  Moreover,  the residuals  from  equation  2 
show no positive tendency in the 1980s, suggesting  that  the targeting  of 
investment  on modernizing  a smaller  capacity  has had little effect upon 
productivity. 
PRODUCT  QUALITY 
In recent years, U.S. producers  of both steel and automobiles  have 
fallen  behind  their  Japanese  counterparts  in product  quality.  The recent 
decline of the dollar has reduced their production  cost disadvantages, 
but if U.S. producers  continue to lag in product  quality  they may still 
find  it difficult  to compete with imports  and with products  produced  by 
foreigners  on U.S. soil. 
Among  the most important  indexes of product  quality  in automobiles 
is reliability  in use. Data  on repair  frequencies  show that  during  the mid- 
1970s,  the Big  Three  U. S. producers  saw their  product  reliability  decline Robert  W. Crandall  285 
Table 8.  Repair Frequency for U.S.  Automobile Producers, Relative to Japanese 
Producers, Model Years 1975-85a 
Model  General 
year  Motors  Ford  Chlrysler 
1975  1.86  1.62  2.47 
1976  1.90  1.67  2.78 
1977  1.42  1.33  2.77 
1978  1.60  1.55  2.80 
1979  2.29  2.38  2.69 
1980  2.89  2.30  2.40 
1981  3.32  2.12  3.45 
1982  3.12  1.44  2.26 
1983  2.82  1.74  2.89 
1984  2.80  2.10  3.33 
1985  2.59  1.89  2.22 
Source: Based  on Consumer Reports,  various  April  issues. 
a. Simple  unweighted  average  repair  frequency  rating  for each company's  most recent  models  minus  the average 
for all Japanese  models  based  on the following  scale: 1 = much  better  than  average;  2  = better  than  average;  3 = 
average;  4 = worse than  average;  5 = much  worse than  average. 
substantially  relative to the Japanese (table 8). A simple regression 
analysis  of these reliability  gaps shows that Ford and Chrysler  reduced 
their substantial  disadvantage  relative to the Japanese on average by 
approximately  20 percent  in 1981-85  and that this reduction  is statistic- 
ally significant.  General  Motors,  by contrast,  failed  to make  statistically 
significant  progress and now has the widest quality gap of the major 
domestic  producers. 
In  the steel  industry,  a spate  ofjoint  ventures  with  Japanese  companies 
has permitted  the U.S. integrated  companies  to offer quality  galvanized 
steel for automotive  applications.  But older rolling  mills and raw steel 
facilities  are still less able to provide  quality  products  than  the facilities 
of many  foreign  competitors. 
Lessons for Policy 
Concern  over the ability  of U.S. industries  to compete  in unrestrained 
international  markets has once again raised protectionist sentiment 
among U.S.  lawmakers. In the past, the stated objectives of import 
quotas  or voluntary  import  restraints  was to provide  temporary  insula- 
tion from  international  competition  to allow particularly  hard-hit  indus- 286  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1987 
tries the opportunity  to regain  market  shares. The experience with the 
auto  and  steel industries  raises serious  questions  about  the effectiveness 
of quotas  as a means  to revitalize  an industry. 
STEEL 
Despite  the trade  protection  of the late 1970s  and 1980s,  the integrated 
steelmakers  were forced to launch a major  retrenchment  in the early 
1980s. These companies began closing plants, reducing  capacity from 
138 million tons in 1980  to 90 million tons in 1987. By the late 1990s, 
integrated  steelmaking  capacity is likely to decline by another 25-30 
million  tons. With only a few exceptions, high construction  costs and 
high steelworker  wage rates have made investment  in large-scale  inte- 
grated  capacity  an uneconomic  proposition  since 1970.  During  the mid- 
1970s, the American  Iron and Steel Institute, and presumably  most of 
its members,  predicted  steel demand  levels for the mid-  1980s  that were 
as much  as 50  percent  too high.  As aresult, these companies  overinvested 
during  the mid-  and  late 1970s.  In 1975,  the companies  expected to need 
30 million  additional  tons of capacity;  in fact, they have actually  retired 
more  than  50 million  tons of their 1975  capacity. 
The smaller  minimills  have increased  their capacity from 10 million 
tons in 1975  to 25 million  tons at present and are likely to have at least 
35  million  tons  by the mid-  1990s.  17  These smaller  companies  will  continue 
to invade the large companies' markets  because of recent changes in 
technology  and the minimills'  lower labor  and materials  costs. Sending 
market  signals to the integrated  firms  in the mid-1970s  to expand and 
modernize  capacity in the 1970s  would have been (and  perhaps  was) a 
serious  error. 
It is unfortunate  that  much  of recent steel policy has been based upon 
a premise  that  more  investment  is required  to make  the industry  healthy. 
Tying reinvestment  of earnings  in steel to trade protection  in the 1984 
Steel Import  Stabilization  Act is the most recent example of this error. 
It  is bad  enough  to base trade  restrictions  upon  faulty  economic  premises; 
it is even worst  to derive  further  conditionality  from  these same  premises. 
17.  Barnett and Crandall, Up from the Ashes. Robert  W. Crandall  287 
AUTOMOBILES 
The situation  for the automobile  industry  was not as desperate  as that 
for steel in the 1980s, though without trade protection, Chrysler  may 
have  failed,  and  industry  profits  would  have  been extremely  low through- 
out  the  first  half  of the 1980s.  The  voluntary  restraints  added  substantially 
to automobile  company  cash flows, but they may  not have raised  output 
or employment. Indeed, Winston and his associates find that the re- 
straints  raised domestic prices and increased cash flow more than $8 
billion per year, but actually reduced industry output 3-4 percent in 
1983-84. 18 
The welfare cost of the restraints, according to Winston and his 
associates, was $5 billion  to the U.S. economy in 1984,  and as much as 
$2 billion  for the United States and  Japan  combined.  19  That  cost peaked 
in 1984-85 and has fallen substantially  since with the decline in the 
dollar.  Had protection  been offered  in the form  of a declining  temporary 
tariff, rather than binding  quotas, the U.S. price response may have 
been lower and  the welfare  loss to the U.S. economy, less. 
Because the restraints  allowed  the United Auto Workers  to maintain 
their  premium  over other manufacturing  wages and even raise it above 
its late 1970s  level, any cost improvements  due to the quotas  would  have 
to be due to their effect upon investment  and the resultant  increases in 
productivity.  Capital  investment  in the motor vehicle industry  acceler- 
ated in 1984-85,  perhaps  in response to the profits  derived  from  quotas. 
But  I can  detect  no improvement  in  productivity  and  only  limited  progress 
in U.S. product  quality  relative  to Japanese  models. 
Another  indirect  effect of the automobile  restraints  may prove to be 
their  most lasting  benefit. As a result  of the restraints,  several  Japanese 
companies accelerated plans to build assembly plants in the United 
States by two to four years. Table 9 lists three plants that are now 
operating  and four that are either  under  construction  or in the planning 
stages. Of these, only the Honda plant was under  development  before 
the restraints were negotiated in  1981. Still, it seems unlikely that 
18. Winston and Associates,  Blind Intersection?,  pp. 64-65. 
19. Three  billion  dollars  of the U.S. welfare  loss is transfers  to the  Japanese  automobile 
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Table 9.  Japanese Investment in U.S.  Automobile Assembly Plants, Various Years, 
1982-89 
Annual  capacity 
(number  Start-up 
Plant  and location  of cars)  date 
Honda (Marysville,  Ohio)  360,000  1982 
Nissan (Smyrna,  Tennessee)  240,000a  1985 
Toyota-General  Motors  (Fremont,  California)  250,000  1984 
Mazda  (Flat Rock, Michigan)  240,000  1987 
Mitsubishi-Chrysler  (Bloomington-Normal,  Illinois)  240,000  1988 
Toyota (Georgetown,  Kentucky)  200,000  1988 
Fuji-Isuzu  (Lafayette,  Indiana)  120,000  1989 
Source:  Japan  Economic  Institute,  "The  U.S. Automobile  Parts  Market  and  Japanese  Competition,"  JEI Report 
IIA (March  20, 1987),  table  4. 
a. Including  pickup  trucks. 
accelerating  the start-up  of these plants-amassing a total capacity of 
1.29 million  cars-could  be worth more than a fraction  of the $10-$15 
billion  welfare  loss absorbed  by U.S. consumers  in 1982-85. 
Perhaps  the greatest  error  in the protection  of U.S. automobiles  has 
been the choice of instrument.  The rigid quotas on Japanese imports 
have allowed a very concentrated  industry  to restrain  output  and raise 
price. The resulting U.S.  economic welfare losses are unlikely to be 
recouped  through  productivity  and quality  improvements  by U.S. pro- 
ducers, but the benefits  of accelerating  the Japanese  investment  in U.S. 
automobile  production  facilities  may  prove to be substantial.  In the end, 
it is  new competition, not the restriction of  competition, that will 
revitalize  the U.S. automobile  industry. 